agencies are prone to capture and manipulation by politicians, regulators, or both. But this conclusion needs to be tempered. Powerful supervision is so strongly correlated with poor national institutions (ineffective government, absence of the rule of law, high corruption) that it is difficult to identify an independent relationship between supervision power and bank corruption when controlling for these institutional traits.
Finally, the authors' findings are consistent with the private monitoring view: bank supervision strategies that focus on forcing accurate information disclosure-and not distorting the incentives of private creditors to monitor banks-facilitate efficient corporate finance. This view recognizes that private agents face substantive information and enforcement costs when monitoring banks, but also that politicians and regulators act in their own interests and not necessarily to reduce market friction. Private monitoring has an especially beneficial effect on the integrity of bank lending in countries with sound legal and administrative institutions.
Bank supervision clearly matters. Policies that redress market failures by forcing accurate disclosure of information reduce the obstacles that firms face in raising external finance, and active bank supervision can help reduce information costs and improve the integrity of bank lending. Powerful supervision agencies too often do not act in the best interests of society.
